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A technology protocol to govern long-term international greenhouse gas emission reduction is 
proposed. The protocol consists of three parameters: a graduation income, below which 
countries have no emission reduction obligations; a convergence rate, at which emission 
intensities should approach that of the most carbon-extensive countries; and an acceleration 
rate, at the which the most carbon-extensive countries should improve its technology over and 
above the business as usual scenario. Depending on the parameter values, emission reduction 
ranges from draconian to almost nil. The graduation income and acceleration rate have the 
expected effects. The effect of the convergence rate is strongly scenario-dependent; some 
scenarios, perhaps unrealistically assume strong technological convergence in the no policy 
case; in other scenarios, adopting best commercial technology in the whole world would lead 
to substantial emission reduction. Not surprisingly, regions prefer different parameters in the 
technology protocol. Adopting the opinion of the median voter, atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide in the year 2200 would be reduced from 1650 ppm to 950 ppm. This reduction 
is relatively robust to changes in crucial model parameters. The costs of complying to the 
technology protocol can be reduced substantially through international trade in emission 
permits and, particularly, banking and borrowing. 
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Although the Kyoto Protocol was apparently saved in Bonn and Marrakech, the 
reinterpretation of the initial agreement also showed the limitations of an international treaty 
based on targets and timetables. At the end of the day, the Kyoto Protocol turned out to be 
only politically acceptable after targets of some countries were watered down considerably, 
and after sanctions for non-compliance were expressed relative to yet to be defined future 
targets. Still, one major party rejected the Kyoto Protocol altogether, while others are 
undecided. 
These difficulties illustrate the inherent problems of managing global public goods, something 
economists have long stressed, also in the context of climate change (Barrett, 1990, 1994; 
Bohm, 1993; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992, 1993; Chen, 1997; Escapa and Gutierrez, 1997; 
Fankhauser and Kverndokk, 1996; Nordhaus and Yang, 1996; Xepapadeas, 1995). If we take 
the conclusions of non-cooperative game theory seriously, then the international climate 
negotiations will not become easier in the future. Perhaps, it is time to explore alternatives to 
the legally binding targets and timetables that are at the heart of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Various people have expressed various kinds of critique on the Kyoto Protocol (Barrett, 2002; 
Böhringer, 2002; Buchner et al., 2002; Common, 1998; Cooper, 1997; Eyckmans et al., 2002; 
Grubb et al., 1999; Lashof, 2000; Manne and Richels, 1999; Metz et al., 2001; Moomaw et al. 
1999; Noble and Scholes, 2001; Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999, Reiner and Jacoby, 2001; Tol, 
1998; Victor and MacDonald, 1997; Yamin, 1998), and various people have suggested 
alternatives (see Müller et al., 2002, for an overview). Edmonds et al. (1994, 1997; see also 
Edmonds and Wise, 1998) propose and analyse a technology protocol: As of a specified date, 
in all countries with an average per capita income above a certain threshold, all new 
investments have to have zero carbon emissions (or need to fully compensate their emissions). 
This protocol drives carbon dioxide emissions to zero and stabilizes the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2, if the specifications are properly chosen, at an acceptable level. 
Here, I analyse a potentially interesting alternative technology protocol. The protocol 
specifies three things. First, the speed at which best available technologies would progress 
and, second, the speed at which inferior technologies would need to converge to that. Third, 
only sufficiently rich countries are subject to the regime. 
A major advantage is that such a protocol is simple. It is easy to explain to governments, and 
to industries; indeed, the US government has adopted it, as have various European 
governments, albeit less openly. Technology protocols have worked in other fields, notably 
vehicle emissions. A major disadvantage is that the environmental result is uncertain because 
the outcome is scenario-dependent and policy is defined relative to the scenario. On the other 
hand, costs are less scenario-dependent than in the case of absolute standards. For instance, if 
technological progress is less than expected, policy automatically become less stringent. The 
simplicity itself is also a drawback: There is little place to hide, little room for political 
manoeuvring. 
Using short-term planning models, BAT standards can readily be converted into emission 
targets, so that (international) trade in emission permits can be the policy instrument for 
implementation. The BAT standard is then only the means by which targets are set. This 
creates an incentive for companies at the technological frontier to invest in R&D. For, if a 
company moves the frontier, the emission target for other companies becomes more stringent, 
so that the company at the frontier can sell either its technology or its emission permits at a 
higher price. This reminds one of the role played by DuPont in the ban of CFC production and 
consumption, stimulation the demand for HFCs (Benedick, 1998). Note that, although this 
would create incentives to accelerate the development of environmental friendly technology, 
welfare would not necessarily improve, as too much may be spent on R&D. In this paper, we do not consider the above effect on technological progress. Instead, energy technology 
improves exogenously. 
In this paper, I will explore the technology protocol sketched above. I will do so using the 
FUND model, described in Section 2. Section 3 analyses the potential of the protocol to 
stabilize emissions for a variety of parameter choices, scenarios of future developments, and 
technology dynamics. Section 4 investigates the incentives of countries to vote for one 
protocol and not for another. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
The model used is version 2.3 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.3 of FUND is the same as version 1.6, described and applied 
by Tol (1999a-e, 2001, 2002a), except for the impact module, which is described by Tol 
(2002b,c).
1 A further difference is the specification of emission reduction costs and 
technological change, detailed below. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. 
The model is specified for nine major world-regions: OECD-America (excl. Mexico); OECD-
Europe; OECD-Pacific (excl. South Korea); Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union; Middle East; Latin America; South and Southeast Asia; Centrally Planned 
Asia; and Africa. The model runs from 1950 to 2200, in time steps of a year. The prime 
reason for starting in 1950 is to initialise the climate change impact module. In FUND, 
climate impacts are assumed to depend on the impact of the year before, to reflect the process 
of adjustment to climate change. Because the starting values in 1950 cannot be approximated 
very well, climate impacts (both physical and monetised) are misrepresented in the first few 
decades. This would bias optimal control if the first decades of the simulation coincided with 
the first decades of emission abatement. Similarly, the 22
nd century is included to provide the 
forward-looking agents in the 21
st century with a long time horizon. The calculated optimal 
emission reductions in 2100-2200 have little meaning (or policy relevance) in and of 
themselves. 
The IMAGE database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994) is the basis for the calibration of the 
model to the period 1950-1990. Scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on the EMF14 
Standardised Scenario, which lies between IS92a and IS92f (cf. Leggett et al., 1992). Note 
that the original EMF14 Standardised Scenario had to be adjusted to fit FUND’s nine regions 
and yearly time-step. The period 1990-2010 is a linear interpolation between observations and 
the EMF14 Standardised Scenario. The period 2100-2200 is an extrapolation of the EMF14 
Standardised Scenario. 
The scenarios concern the rate of population growth, urbanisation, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, the rate of decarbonization of the energy use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land 
use change, methane and nitrous oxide.  
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climate 
change. Population falls with climate change deaths, resulting from changes in heat stress, 
cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to affect only the 
elderly, non-reproductive population. The other sources of mortality do affect the number of 
births. Heat stress only affects urban population. The share of urban in total population is, up 
to 2025, based on the World Resources Databases; after 2025, urban population slowly 
                                                 
1   More information and the source code of the model can be found at http://www.uni-
hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/fund.html. converges to 95% of total population (comparable to present day Belgium or Kuwait). 
Population also changes with climate-induced migration between the regions. Immigrants are 
assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the host population. 
The tangible impacts of climate change are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption 
and investment are reduced, without changing the saving’s rate. Climate change thus reduces 
long-term economic growth, although at the short term consumption takes a deeper cut. 
Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide emission abatement. 
The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply 
autonomously decrease over time. This process can be sped up by abatement policies. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact of carbon dioxide 
emission reductions on economy and emissions, and the impact of the damages of climate 
change on the economy and the population. 
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted: 
(1)    ( ) t t-1 t t-1 pre C  =  C + E - C -C a b  
where C denotes concentration, E emissions, t year, and pre pre-industrial. Table 1 displays 
the parameters for both gases. 
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide follows from a five-box model: 





i i, t C  =   Box ￿a  
where ai denotes the fraction of emissions E (in million metric tonnes of carbon) that is 
allocated to box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10, respectively) and r the decay-rate of the 
boxes (r = exp(-1/lifetime), with life-times infinity, 363, 74, 17 and 2 years, respectively). 
The model is due to Meier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987), its parameters are due to Hammitt 
et al. (1992). Thus, 13% of total emissions remains forever in the atmosphere, while 10% is—
on average—removed in two years. Carbon dioxide concentrations are measured in parts per 
million by volume. 
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are based on Shine et al. 
(1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium 
(determined by radiative forcing RF), with a half-time of 50 years. In the base case, global 
mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents, 
so: 















Global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the 
temperature and a life-time of 50 years. Temperature and sea level are calibrated to the best 
guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate impact module is based on Tol (2002b,c). A limited number of categories of the 
impact of climate change are considered: agriculture, forestry sea level rise, cardiovascular 
and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, 
schistosomiasis, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems.  People can prematurely die (because of temperature stress or vector-borne diseases) or 
migrate (because of sea level rise). These effects, like all impacts, are monetized. The value of 
a statistical life is set at 200 times the per capita income. The resulting value of a statistical 
life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The 
value of emigration is set at 3 times the per capita income (Tol, 1995, 1996), the value of 
immigration at 40% of the per capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Dryland and 
wetland loss due to sea level rise are explicitly modelled. Dryland loss is valued at $4 million 
per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value 
is assumed proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland loss is valued at $2 million per 
square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Wetland value is 
assumed to be logistic in per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit 
analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to dike building and consequent 
coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories (agriculture, forestry, energy, water, ecosystems) are directly 
expressed in money, without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units 
(cf. Tol, 2002b). 
Damage can be due to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of 
change (benchmarked at 2.5°C). Benchmark estimates are displayed in Table 2. Damage in 
the rate of temperature change slowly fades, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture and cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases explicitly recognise that there is a climate optimum. A mix of factors, 
including plant physiology and farmer behaviour, determines the climate optimum. Impacts 
are positive or negative depending on whether climate is moving to or away from that 
optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate is further away from the optimum 
climate. The optimum climate concerns the potential impacts. Actual impacts lag behind 
potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully 
adapted to the new climate are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
Other impacts of climate change, on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water 
resources, malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis, are modelled as simple power functions. 
Impacts are either negative or positive, but do not change sign (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
Vulnerability changes with population growth, economic growth, and technological progress. 
Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water resources (with 
population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanisation) and ecosystems and health 
(with higher values from higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to become 
less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with 
economic growth) and vector-borne diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
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The carbon intensity of energy use, and the energy intensity of production follow from: 
(5)  ,,1,1,1
yy yyat --- =- rtrtrtrt g  
and 
(6)  ,,1,1,1
jj jjat --- =- rtrtrtrt g  
where ô is policy intervention. Policy also affects emissions via (4’)  ( )( ) ,,,,,,
yj ycjc =-- rtrtrtrtrtrt MY  
(7)  ,,1,1 (1)
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and 
(8)  ,,1,1 (1)
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Thus, the parameter 0 < á < 1 governs which part of emission reduction is permanent 
(reducing carbon and energy intensities) and which part of emission reduction is temporary 
(reducing energy consumptions and carbon emissions), fading at a rate of 0 < ê < 1. 
Alternatively, one can interpret the difference between permanent and temporary emission 
reduction as affecting commercial technologies and capital stocks, respectively. The 
behaviour of the emission reduction module is similar as the models of Grubb et al. (1995), 
Ha-Duong et al. (1997) and Hasselmann et al. (1997). 


























That is, emission reduction is relatively expensive for the region that has the lowest emission 
intensity. The calibration is such that a 10% emission reduction cut would cost 2.24% of GDP 
of the least carbon-intensive region. Emission reduction is relatively cheap for regions with 
high emission intensities. The thought is that emission reduction is cheap in countries that use 
a lot of energy and rely heavily on fossil fuels, while other countries use less energy and less 
fossil fuels. The model has been calibrated to the results reported in Hourcade et al. (1996). 
The regional and global knowledge stocks follow from 
(11)  ,,1,1 1 rtrtRrt HH gt -- =+  
and 
(12)  1, 1
GG
ttGrt HH gt - =+  
Knowledge accumulates with emission abatement. The parameters ã determines which part of 
the knowledge is kept within the region, and which part spills over to other regions as well. In 
the base case, ãR=0.9 and ãG=0.1. The model is similar in structure and numbers to that of 
Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Goulder and Mathai (2000). 
Governments intervene to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the price of 
emissions. The state of technology is measured by the overall emission intensity of the 
economy, that is, the carbon dioxide emitted per dollar GDP. The country with the lowest 
emission intensity needs to accelerate the decline in emission intensity with á percent per 
year. Other countries need to accelerate their emission intensity decline by the same amount 
plus â times the difference in their emission intensity with that of the technology leader. 













where R denotes emission reduction (in percent from baseline), E denotes emissions, Y 
denotes GDP, t denotes time, and c˛C denotes country. 
Countries with a per capita income lower than yc are exempt from emission reduction. There 
is an additional advantage to this. If joint implementation is allowed for, countries below the 
income threshold can still engage in emission reduction and sell the credits to other countries. 
This reduces their emission intensity, so by the time they pass the income threshold, their 
emission reduction obligation is smaller. 
 
3.  Emission Reduction Potential 
Figure 1 shows the atmospheric concentration in the year 2200, the final year of the model 
run, as a function of the key parameters of the technology protocol as well as the parameter 
that covers the dynamics of technology as driven by emission abatement policy. Qualitatively, 
Figure 1 offers no surprises. If emission intensities converge faster to that of the technology 
leader, the final CO2 concentration falls. If the emission intensity of the technology leader 
falls faster, the final CO2 concentration falls. If regions with lower incomes are subject to the 
protocol, the final CO2 concentration falls. If a larger share of the policy induced emission 
reduction is permanent, the final CO2 concentration falls. Quantitatively, the following pattern 
emerges. Concentrations range everywhere between 530 and 1650 ppm. Only implementing 
the same technologies as in the most advanced region could considerably cut concentrations. 
If all regions with an income above $2500 per person per year participate, and converge at a 
rate of 20% per decade to the technology leader, concentrations fall from 1650 ppm to 930 
ppm. If technological progress in the leading country is accelerated by 10% (20%) per decade, 
concentrations fall to 670 ppm (530 ppm). The income threshold has a smaller influence than 
do the convergence and acceleration parameters. Increasing the threshold from $2500 to 
$5000 would raise concentrations by some 60 ppm; decreasing the threshold to $500 would 
decrease concentrations by some 100 ppm. The reason for this relatively low sensitivity is that 
the currently most important emitters are covered by the protocol anyway, while the future 
large emitters (Asia) are assumed to have very rapid economic growth. The assumptions 
about the permanence of emission abatement matter a lot – 300-400 ppm difference – 
particularly if emission reduction is not so strict. This emphasises the importance of 
technology. 
The above analysis is for a single scenario of future developments only. As the future is 
uncertain, this is not very convincing. Figure 2 displays the atmospheric concentration of 
carbon dioxide in 2200 for 11 different scenarios. The convergence parameter is varied 
between 0 and 0.2, but the acceleration parameter is kept at 0. Consequently, the left most 
points of the graphs are the unregulated concentrations in 2200. These differ between 425 
ppm (SRES B1) and 1833 ppm (IS92f), underlying the great uncertainty about future 
emissions. The right most points show the result of an aggressive convergence policy. Such as 
policy would reduce emissions anywhere between 30 ppm (SRES B1) and 794 ppm (IS92f). 
In general, the scenarios with low baseline emissions assume more rapid convergence of 
carbon intensities than do scenarios with high baseline emissions. This emphasizes the 
importance of technology diffusion in emission control, either as a deliberate policy or as by-
product of other developments. 
 
4.  Incentives The previous section analyses the potential of a technology protocol to reduce atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide. It finds that a technology protocol can be very effective, but 
also have only a negligible impact, depending on its specification and the business as usual 
scenario. Here, the attention is turned to the incentives of regions to advocate a certain 
specification of such a protocol. These incentives consist of two components, viz. the costs of 
emission reduction and the benefits of less climate change. The criterion used is the net 
present welfare of the year 2000. 
Table 3 displays the preferred technology protocol of FUND’s nine regions. The regional 
optimum was found by a simple grid search in three dimensions: the threshold income, the 
acceleration parameter, and the convergence parameter. Three regions are not interested in 
greenhouse gas emission reduction whatsoever: OECD-America, the Middle East, and China. 
South and Southeast Asia and Africa advocate quite drastic emission reduction – recall that 
the technology protocol applies to all regions. OECD-Europe and the former Soviet Union are 
less enthusiastic about emission abatement, and OECD-Pacific and Latin America even less 
so. 
If we take the CO2 concentration as a criterion, OECD-Pacific casts the median vote, that is, 
there are four regions that advocate a lower concentration than does OECD-Pacific, and four 
regions that advocate a higher concentration. An advantage of median voting (for targets) is 
that it is robust to strategic behaviour. The only way for, say, OECD-America to influence the 
outcome is to bid lower than does OECD-Pacific, while OECD-America already thinks the 
outcome is too low. Table 3 also shows regional welfare if the proposal by OECD-Pacific is 
implemented. Welfare is shown relative to the case without emission reduction, and relative to 
the regional optimum. Welfare losses are small: The maximum is 1.2%. 
If instead of the median vote, some cooperative welfare criterion (additive or multiplicative, 
relative or absolute, population-weighted or none) is maximised, then the do-nothing policy 
advocated by OECD-America, the Middle East and China would result. The reason is that 
these three regions agree, whereas the preferred policies of the other regions are far apart. 
Tables A1 and A2 (in the Appendix) repeat the information of Table 3, but now for the case in 
which most of the policy induced emission reduction is transient (Table A1) and for the case 
in which most of it is permanent (Table A2). If the effects of emission abatement last longer, 
emission reduction becomes cheaper – therefore, all regions vote for a more stringent 
protocol. The relative positions of regions are not affected, so OECD-Pacific remains the 
median voter. If the effects of emission abatement policy last shorter, emission reduction 
becomes more expensive – therefore, all regions vote for a less stringent protocol. In this case, 
OECD-Pacific looses interest in emission reduction altogether, and Latin America becomes 
the median voter – with a little ambitious proposal. 
Tables A3 and A4 vary the speed of learning-by-doing, 50% up and down. For most regions, 
faster (slower) learning implies more (less) ambitious emission reduction targets; the effect is 
small, however, reflecting the fact that future learning has a limited effect on net present 
welfare. South and Southeast Asia and Africa are the exception. Both regions prefer 
substantially less emission reduction, regardless whether learning is faster or slower than in 
the base case. South and Southeast Asia will become a large emitter of carbon dioxide, while 
Africa, under the rules of the technology protocol, cannot get China and South and Southeast 
Asia to cut emissions without accepting emission reduction targets itself. Slower learning, 
including less international technology spillover, would increase abatement costs in South and 
Southeast Asia and Africa considerably. On the other hand, in the base case, South and 
Southeast Asia and Africa prefer drastic emission reduction in the richer countries, not only 
by cutting emissions directly but also through slower economic growth. With faster learning, 
the latter effect disappears, so that South and Southeast Asia and Africa would have to take more emission reduction onto themselves – while international technology spillover is still 
considerably slower than intra-regional learning. South and Southeast Asia is the median 
voter with both faster and slower learning; note that its preferred policy does not deviate much 
from the median policy in the base case. 
The selected protocols stress convergence of energy intensities over technology acceleration. 
As convergence is relative, this implies rapid emission reduction in the early decades, and 
slower abatement later on. However, a cost-effective trajectory to any given concentration 
target would stress later rather than earlier emission reduction (Manne and Richels, 1998, 
1999; Richels and Edmonds, 1995; Wigley et al., 1996). We adopt the technology protocol in 
two alternative ways. Firstly, the convergence parameter – the â in equation (13) – grows 
linearly over time with a factor that is subject to optimisation as well. Table A5 shows the 
results. Secondly, the protocol enters into force only after a certain date, another parameter 
subject to optimisation. Table A6 shows the results. The two alternatives show a clear pattern. 
Timing is not the crucial issue. The regions who oppose emission reduction do not change 
their position if they can start later or slower. The regions who advocate emission reduction 
are less affected by relative convergence, and more or less maintain their position. 
 
5.  Costs 
Figure 3 presents the costs of the technology protocol as preferred by OECD-Pacific, the 
median voter (cf. Table 3). Costs are measured as consumption losses in the period 2000-
2200, discounted to 2000 with a discount rate of 5% per year. Total costs are some $26 
trillion, a hefty price for keeping CO2 concentrations under 950 ppm (Weyant, 1993, 1998; 
Weyant and Hill, 1999). The reason is that this technology protocol places a lot of emphasis 
on (relative!) convergence. Consequently, most emission reduction is concentrated in the 
early decades. The carbon-inefficient economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union bear a lot of the costs. 
The regional emission reductions under the technology protocol can be interpreted as the 
initial allocations of carbon permits in an international market. Figure 3 shows that the costs 
fall if where flexibility is introduced, and that the burden of emission reduction shifts towards 
the OECD. Note that the costs after trade, as presented in Figure 3, are only a potential Pareto 
improvement. 
Figure 3 also displays the costs of technology protocols with an intermediate and high 
emphasis on acceleration rather than convergence, keeping the same concentration targets. 
Costs are very sensitive to this, as emission reduction (costs) are shifted to the future. Costs 
are also shifted from CEE&fSU to the OECD. Emissions trade would lower costs further, but 
only to a limited extent. This is a reflection of the fact that, under the technology protocol, all 
regions have emission obligations, including the regions that under Kyoto-like agreements 
would be great suppliers of cheap emission reduction. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the costs of cost-effective path towards 950 ppm, introducing when-
flexibility or banking & borrowing. Costs fall considerably, as emission reduction is pushed 
further into the future. This underlines that, without introducing flexibility, a technology 
protocol may be a needlessly expensive manner of reducing emissions. Still, it should be 
emphasized that, although $26 trillion may seems a lot of money, economic growth continues 
largely unabated. 
 6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents an alternative to the absolute emission standards of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The international treaty analysed here focuses on reducing emission intensities (as proposed 
by President Bush) as well as on reducing the differences in emission intensities between 
countries. The main advantage of this strategy is that the costs of emission reduction are 
robust against economic variability. The main disadvantage is that emissions are uncertain. 
Another advantage is that this protocol emphasizes improving technology (a positive thing) 
rather than reducing emission (a negative thing). 
The technology protocol analysed here consist of three parts: a threshold income, above 
which countries are obliged to partake; a convergence rate, at which differences between 
countries are closed; and an acceleration rate, at which the most carbon-efficient country gets 
even more efficient. Depending on the parameters chosen, virtually any long-term 
concentration target can be met. 
In some scenarios, convergence leads to substantial emission reduction. If the whole world 
were as energy- and carbon-efficient as Japan, total emissions would be a lot less. Other 
scenarios assume that other countries converge rapidly to Japanese standards, even in the 
absence of climate policies. 
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Gas    a
a    b
b    pre-industrial concentration 
Methane (CH4)    0.3597    1/8.6    790 ppb 
Nitrous oxide (N2O)    0.2079    1/120    285 ppb 
a   The parameter a translates emissions (in million metric tonnes of CH4 or N2O) into concentrations (in parts 
per billion by volume). 
b   The parameter b determines how fast concentrations return to their pre-industrial (and assumedly 
equilibrium) concentrations; 1/b is the atmospheric life-time (in years) of the gases. 
Source: After Schimel et al. (1996). Table 2. Estimated impacts of a 1°C increase in the global mean temperature. Standard 
deviations are given in brackets. 
  Billion dollar  percent of GDP 
OECD-A  175  (107)  3.4  (2.1) 
OECD-E  203  (118)  3.7  (2.2) 
OECD-P  32  (35)  1.0  (1.1) 
CEE&fSU  57  (108)  2.0  (3.8) 
ME  4  (8)  1.1  (2.2) 
LA  -1  (5)  -0.1  (0.6) 
S&SEA  -14  (9)  -1.7  (1.1) 
CPA  9  (22)  2.1  (5.0) 
AFR  -17  (9)  -4.1  (2.2) 





d  Loss (NC)
e  Loss (Opt)
f 
OECD-A  -  0.000  0.000  1648  0.319  0.319 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.165  816  -0.065  0.066 
OECD-P  2500  0.000  0.185  945  -0.002  0.000 
CEE&fSU  500  0.015  0.025  655  0.530  0.810 
ME  -  0.000  0.000  1648  0.910  0.910 
LA  11500  0.000  0.050  1400  0.213  0.215 
S&SEA  8500  0.200  0.035  440  0.033  0.141 
CPA  -  0.000  0.000  1648  1.157  1.157 
AFR  2000  0.290  0.005  347  -0.360  0.944 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and above the no control 
scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology leader. 
d The carbon dioxide concentration in 2200. 
e The difference in net present welfare between the median scenario and the do nothing scenario, as a percentage 
of the do nothing scenario. 
f The difference in net present welfare between the median scenario and the regionally optimal scenario, as a 
percentage of the regionally optimal scenario. Figure 1. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in the year 2200 as a function of 
the three parameters of the technology protocol and as a function of the assumed technology 
dynamics. On the x-axis, 2200 concentrations are plotted as a function of the speed with 
which regions convergence to the most carbon-efficient region. The first element in the 
legend is the threshold income. It is varied between $500 and $5000, with a default value of 
$2500. The second element of the legend is the rate of technological progress above the 
business as usual scenario for the technology leader. It is varied between 0.0 and 0.2, with a 
default value of 0.1, that is, 10% per decade. The third element of the legend is the share of 
















































































































5Figure 2. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in the year 2200 as a function of 
the speed with which regions converge to the most carbon efficient region for the FUND 
scenario, three IS92a scenarios, and seven SRES scenarios. The threshold income is $2500. 
The rate of technological progress above the business as usual scenario for the technology 



















































































































































































































Figure 3. The net present consumption losses of the “technology protocol” proposed by 
OECD-Pacific (see Table 3), which has a low emphasis on technology acceleration and a high 
emphasis on technology convergence; a “mid alternative” with intermediate emphasis on 
technology acceleration, and a “high alternative” with high emphasis on acceleration. Costs 
are presented without and “with trade”. Also shown is the case the full where and when 
flexibility (“and banking”). Appendix 
 







OECD-A  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.125  1170 
OECD-P  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
CEE&fSU  500  0.000  0.040  1430 
ME  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
LA  11500  0.000  0.025  1581 
S&SEA  8500  0.210  0.005  439 
CPA  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
AFR  2000  0.290  0.005  350 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology 
leader. 







OECD-A  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.195  666 
OECD-P  2500  0.000  0.135  905 
CEE&fSU  500  0.020  0.015  439 
ME  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
LA  11500  0.000  0.055  1266 
S&SEA  8500  0.210  0.005  437 
CPA  -  0.000  0.000  1648 
AFR  2000  0.265  0.015  346 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology 
leader. 
d The carbon dioxide concentration in 2200. Table A3. The technology protocols as preferred by the nine regions for ãR=1.35 and ãG=0.15 






OECD-A  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.16  821 
OECD-P  2500  0.000  0.19  935 
CEE&fSU  500  0.010  0.03  769 
ME  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
LA  9000  0.000  0.03  1443 
S&SEA  7000  0.000  0.15  1087 
CPA  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
AFR  10500  0.100  0.17  642 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology 
leader. 
d The carbon dioxide concentration in 2200. Table A4. The technology protocols as preferred by the nine regions for ãR=0.45 and ãG=0.05 






OECD-A  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.14  853 
OECD-P  2500  0.000  0.19  931 
CEE&fSU  500  0.005  0.04  912 
ME  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
LA  9000  0.000  0.03  1443 
S&SEA  7000  0.000  0.17  1062 
CPA  -  0.000  0.00  1648 
AFR  7500  0.100  0.17  447 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology 
leader. 
d The carbon dioxide concentration in 2200. Table A5. The technology protocols as preferred by the nine regions for ever faster 




c  Inc. Conv.
d  Concentration
e 
OECD-A  -  0.000  0.00  0.0000  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.11  0.0005  763 
OECD-P  2500  0.000  0.11  0.0000  1059 
CEE&fSU  500  0.015  0.01  0.0005  603 
ME  -  0.000  0.00  0.0000  1648 
LA  7000  0.000  0.03  0.0000  1423 
S&SEA  7000  0.000  0.11  0.0000  1159 
CPA  -  0.000  0.00  0.0000  1648 
AFR  500  0.020  0.18  0.0005  545 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The initial annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the 
technology leader. 
d The annual rate at which the convergence rate increases; cf. note c. 







OECD-A  -  0.000  0.00  -  1648 
OECD-E  500  0.000  0.15  2000  840 
OECD-P  500  0.000  0.15  2040  1011 
CEE&fSU  500  0.015  0.03  2000  644 
ME  -  0.000  0.00  -  1648 
LA  7000  0.000  0.03  2000  1423 
S&SEA  7000  0.005  0.00  2000  1344 
CPA  -  0.000  0.00  -  1648 
AFR  2000  0.075  0.14  2000  364 
a The threshold income above which regions reduce emissions. 
b The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of the technology leader improves over and 
above the no control scenario. 
c The annual rate at which the carbon efficiency of regions converges to that of the technology 
leader. 
d The starting year of emission reduction. 
e The carbon dioxide concentration in 2200. Working Papers 
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